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Can Virtue Be Taught?
Ethics and Education in Aristotle 1
You may have seen a recent Doonesbury cartoon, one of a
series in which Garry Trudeau poked fun at State
Assemblyman Vasconcellos and his "self-esteem commission." The scene is a press conference, at which
Vasconcellos has presented the results of the commission's
study. Reporter Rick Redfern, having called Vasconcellos'
attention to the fact that the study could posit no causal connection between self-esteem and its alleged benefits, asks
Vasconcellos, "In the light of that, isn't it possible that selfesteem isn't causal at all, but simply the happy side effect of
a sturdy character, itself the product of unambiguous moral
education?" The final frame shows Vasconcellos whispering
to an aide, "Call Security. He must be from out of state."
Of course, there is something, if not "out of state," then at
least "out of place," about the reporter's question. The expressions "sturdy character" and "unambiguous moral education" are part of the moral vocabulary of an earlier era;
and, indeed, the assumption that self-esteem should be based
on morality is itself an assumption that seems quaintly archaic in an age dominated by therapeutic models of psychological development. This feeling of archaism is not mistaken; for Redfern's question, I think, is exactly the question
that Aristotle would have asked. The question contains an
incisive summary of Aristotle's theory of moral education:
self-esteem (Aristotle would have said eudaimonia, which
we translate inaccurately as "happiness") results from virtue
(arete, more properly translated as "excellence"); and a necessary ingredient in virtue is what Redfern calls a good char-

1 This paper was originally delivered at the Spring meeting of the
California Classical Association at Santa Clara University on May 12,
1990, as part of a program entitled "Education and the Ancient
Philosophers."
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acter, resulting precisely from an unambiguous moral education.
Redfern's question, though archaic, is not irrelevant; for
Aristotle's moral theory, though quaint-sounding to modem
ears, is by no means obsolete. The topic for this conference,
as I understand it, originated in a practical concern about the
moral education of American youth. I am one of those people who thinks that the study of the classics is valuable, not
primarily for what it tells us about some long dead civilizations and individuals, but for what light it can shed on our
own culture and lives. My conviction, I should state at the
outset, is that the classics in general, and Aristotle in particular, can tell us much about contemporary moral education,
and that we ignore its and his lessons at our peril.
I shall assume that I am speaking to an audience of people
who do not work with Aristotle's ethical theory on a daily
basis, and are therefore on less than intimate terms with it. If
some in the audience are Aristotle scholars, they are bound
to be disappointed with the obviousness of what I say. Even
if you are not Aristotle scholars you may find the content of
these remarks obvious. That is because a good deal of
Aristotle's ethical theory is simply common sense. I don't
think it is futile or profitless, however, to remind ourselves
of what common sense and Aristotle have to say on the subject of moral education, especially since contemporary educational theory diverges from both a great deal.
I want to begin my presentation of Aristotle's views with a
brief look at his predecessor and mentor, Plato. You probably remember the answer that Plato gave to the question
"Can virtue be taught?" in the Meno. There, in response to
Meno's skepticism about the possibility of discovering the
nature of virtue (a skepticism induced by Socrates' refutation
of his various attempts to define virtue), Plato had Socrates
present his famous theory that learning is recollection. It is
possible to teach virtue, Plato suggests, because people already have an innate knowledge of the nature of virtue,
knowledge that has been acquired during the previous existence of the soul, prior to its present embodiment, and that
can be brought to consciousness by means of skillful questioning.
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This Platonic account of the acquisition of virtue is intellectual through and through. One learns to be virtuous by
coming to know what virtue is. One comes to know this as
the result of philosophical inquiry, under the guidance of one
who knows how to examine others. (Socrates was, of
course, the prototype and in fact Plato's only example of
such a person.) What one acquires as a result of this inquiry
is an explicit definition of virtue, which is grounded in some
previous acquaintance with the Form of Virtue itself. (The
Meno does not explicitly describe recollection as a process
that involves Forms, but the Phaedo does.) The account of
learning as recollection not only provides a positive aim for
the Socratic practice of examining others, it explains the
Socratic paradox that virtue is knowledge.
This Platonic model of the teaching of virtue resembles in
some ways a popular recent theory of moral education, that
of Lawrence Kohlberg. Kohlberg's student, like Plato's,
possesses an innate understanding of morality, which is to
be developed by a process of education that is thoroughly
intellectual. According to Kohlberg, what the child possesses is not knowledge of the nature of virtue,2 but an innate program of moral development that proceeds through
six stages to an enlightened understanding of the nature of
ethics; but, though the alleged content of the knowledge possessed by the child is different, its innateness and the method
of eliciting it are the same as in Plato.
There are problems with this picture of moral education,
intellectually appealing though it may be. First of all, it
offers no explanation (beyond the presence or absence of the
right kind of intellectual stimulation) for why people differ in
their moral knowledge. If the same knowledge or sequence
of stages is innately programmed into us all, why do so few
of us attain full moral insight? Second, it does not explain

2 Kohlberg rejects virtue as a key element in moral education, and
claims not to know what virtue is; see Christina Hoff Sommers,
"Ethics without Virtue," The American Scholar 1984, 384.
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the fact that the content of moral practice differs from culture
to culture. Even if the universal nature of moral judgment is
the same everywhere, customs play some role in our moral
actions; but these theories give no account of that role.
Third, and perhaps most important, the Plato-Kohlberg
theory does not seem to give an accurate portrait of the way
in which people actually shape their moral sensitivities. It is
not primarily though intellectual inquiry that people develop
morally, but through the process of making moral decisions
in the course of their lives and by experiencing the effects on
themselves of the decisions of others.
Plato was aware of at least some of these problems, as the
end of the Meno shows. No sooner do Socrates and Meno
reach the conclusion that virtue is knowledge than Socrates
raises two powerful objections to that contention. First, if
virtue is knowledge, there ought to be expert teachers of the
subject, as there are in mathematics, medicine and the other
sciences. Yet no such teachers exist, unless the claims of the
Sophists are accepted. Second, there are people who seem
pre-eminent in virtue (Socrates puts forth Themistocles,
Aristides, Pericles and Thucydides son of Melesias, all bona
fide Athenian heroes), but who are not virtuous by knowledge. (In the cases mentioned, Socrates cites the fact that
they could not pass on their virtue to their children as proof
that they did not have moral knowledge.)
If there are virtuous people who lack knowledge, how did
they acquire their virtue? Plato's answer is that it came to
them in the form of right opinion, as a result of divine inspiration. At the end of the Meno the possibility of acquiring
virtue in the form of knowledge seems to have receded to a
remote possibility:
If all we have said in this discussion, and the questions
we have asked, have been right, virtue will be acquired
neither by nature nor by teaching. Whoever has it gets it
by divine dispensation without taking thought, unless he
be the kind of statesman who can create another like
himself. Should there be such a man, he would be
among the living practically what Homer said Tiresias
was among the dead, when he described him as the only
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one in the underworld who kept his wits- 'the others are
mere flitting shades.' Where virtue is concerned, such a
man would be just like that, a solid reality among shadows [Meno 99e-100a, tr. Guthrie].
Plato's resort to divine inspiration to explain the existence
of correct moral judgment that falls short of knowledge
seems a desperate expedient. Even if one allows that phenomena of that sort may on occasion occur, it is simply not
the case that we wait to hear the word of God before making
up our minds what we ought to do about most moral matters. It is at this point that Aristotle's account of moral education provides an attractive alternative.
For Aristotle, as for Plato, moral education is education in
the virtues. Aristotle distinguishes two sorts of virtue: moral
and intellectual. This distinction is based on a distinction
between parts of the soul. In Nicomachean Ethics 1.13,
Aristotle divides the soul into two parts: the rational and the
irrational. The irrational part he again divides in two: there is
the vegetative part, which is responsible for nutrition and
growth, and which he dismisses as irrelevant to ethics; and
there is another part, which it turns out later is the locus of
our appetites and emotions. This part, in morally weak
people at least, "fights and resists the guidance of reason"
[1102b17, tr. Ostwald]; in morally strong and virtuous people, however, it "accepts the leadership of reason" [27] and
"partakes of reason insofar as it complies with reason and
accepts its leadership" [31-2].
As Aristotle points out at the start of Book II, different
methods exist for acquiring the two kinds of virtue:
"Intellectual virtue ... owes its origin and development chiefly
to teaching ... Moral virtue, on the other hand, is formed by
habit (ethos)" [1103a15-17]. Habit, in tum, is formed by
action:
Men become builders by building houses, and harpists
by playing the harp. Similarly, we become just by the
practice of just actions, self-controlled by exercising selfcontrol, and courageous by performing acts of courage
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[ 1103a 33-b32] ... in our transactions with other men it is
by action that some become just and others unjust, and it
is by acting in the face of danger and by developing the
habit of feeling fear or confidence that some become
brave men and others cowards ... In a word, characteristics develop from corresponding activities [1103b14-17,
21-22].
Aristotle regarded the formation of proper habits, that is, of
moral virtues, as the necessary foundation for the kind of
moral reflection that is the proper activity of the intellectual
virtue of phronesis,practical wisdom. Without moral virtue,
as we shall see, there can be no practical wisdom. That is
why Aristotle says:
Hence it is no small matter whether one habit or another
is inculcated in us from early childhood; on the contrary,
it makes a considerable difference, or, rather, all the difference [1103b23-25].
That is also why he thought it futile to attempt to teach
ethics to people who had not been raised properly: "to be a
competent student of what is right and just, ... one must first
have received a proper upbringing in moral conduct" [1.4,
1095b4-6]. The attempt to substitute moral argument for
proper habituation, he thought, was doomed to failure:
Most men do not perform such acts, but by taking refuge
in argument they think that they are engaged in philosophy and that they will become good in this way. In so
doing, they act like sick men who listen attentively to
what the doctor says, but fail to do any of the things he
prescribes. That kind of philosophical activity will not
bring health to the soul any more than this sort of treatment will prcxlucea healthy bcxly [11055b12-18].
If Aristotle is correct about the necessity of habituation for
moral development, then one part of our question is answered. Can virtue be taught? Moral virtue cannot, but it can
be acquired by practice. But this answer itself suggests addi-
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tional questions. First, one might ask why any training is
necessary. Proponents of the "values clarification" approach
to moral education would argue that this training is the imposition of the values of society, or perhaps of the child's
parents, on the child, and that the child should be allowed to
discover his or her own values. Aristotle's answer is that
children do not find virtuous actions initially pleasant, and
that training is needed to enable them to do so, just as physical conditioning is needed to enable people to enjoy vigorous
exercise, and intellectual training necessary to enable them to
enjoy, say, reading Greek authors in the original. It is an interesting question, which I cannot even attempt to answer
here, why our society is in general willing to endorse the "no
pain, no gain" model for physical conditioning, but insists
that moral development ought not to place unwelcome demands on the young.
Note that Aristotle's endorsement of a strenuous program of
moral habituation is not based on an ascetic preference for
burdensome duty over pleasant indolence. Unlike Kant, for
instance, he thinks that virtuous action is pleasant for the
virtuous person, and that in fact one mark of the truly virtuous (as opposed to the morally strong) person is that he or
she genuinely enjoys performing virtuous acts. Indeed,
Aristotle suggests in places that only the good person knows
what is really pleasant (cf., e.g., II.3, VII.9, X.3). But he
also insists that not all pleasures are equally available to everyone: the pleasures of a morally good person can only be
experienced by one who has undergone the training necessary to become good.
A second question might be, who is to oversee the moral
habituation of the young? The alternatives seem to be, the
family and the state. Given the choice, Aristotle somewhat
surprisingly (to us) prefers the state. In Politics VIII. I he
writes:
For the exercise of any faculty or art a previous training
and habituation are required; clearly therefore for the
practice of virtue. And since the whole city has one end,
it is manifest that education should be one and the same
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for all, and that it should be public, and not private-not,
as at present, when everyone looks after his own
children separately, and gives them separate instruction
of the sort which he thinks best; the training in things
which are of common interest should be the same for all.
Neither must we suppose that any one of the citizens
belongs to himself, for they all belong to the state, and
are each of them a part of the state, and the care of each
part is inseparable from the care of the whole. In this
particular as in some others the Lacedaimonians are to be
praised, for they take the greatest pains about their
children, and make education the business of the state
[1337a19-32, tr. Jowett].
Now rhetoric of this sort inevitably suggests to modem ears
the indoctrination of children in totalitarian states, so perhaps
it is useful to recall that the end of the state, as he sees it, is
the good life for the individuals in it, and that Aristotle's
sentiments about the relation of the citizen to the state are not
much different from those that Thucydides attributes to that
great champion of democracy, Pericles, in his funeral oration. The point Aristotle is trying to get across is that moral
education serves a public good, something in which we have
a common interest. Because the American political tradition
focuses more on the liberty of the individual and less on the
common good than did classical political theory, and because
modem Americans tend to think of ethics as personal rather
than as public, we may find his recommendation that the
state undertake moral education unpalatable; but it was only a
generation ago that the public schools took it for granted that
this was one of their primary educational aims. One might
also note that the state that Aristotle recommends conduct
moral education was the Greek polis, a far more homogeneous and unified entity than the contemporary United
States. If one agrees with Alasdair MacIntyre that the contemporary nation state has long lost the requisite moral authority to oversee moral education,3 one may find the family,

3 After Virtue (South Bend, 1981), p. 195.
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or perhaps the local community, the only acceptable alternative. (It is interesting to note that Aristotle had another, more
practical motive for suggesting that moral education be a
matter of public, rather than private, control, a motive every
parent will sympathize with: "A father's command," he remarks in N.E. X.9, "does not have the power to enforce or
compel," but the law does.)
If the size, diversity and moral ambiguity of the modern
state, the emphasis on individual liberty in contemporary
American society, and the understanding of ethics as a private matter are all obstacles to the practice of moral education
as Aristotle recommended it, they are also indicators of how
different the assumptions of the fourth century Athenian audience were from ours and of how much more straightforward the task of moral education must have seemed, not just
to Aristotle but to anyone of that era, than it does to us.
A third question that is sure to be raised in these skeptical
times is, "How are we to know what actions are to be habituated in young people?" As a modern proponent of moral
pluralism might put it, "Whose values are we to inculcate?"
Aristotle's answer to this question goes to the heart of his
ethical theory, and gives us an indication of its distance from
modern accounts of ethics. Naturally, Aristotle wants children to learn virtuous actions rather than vicious ones; but
how can we tell what acts are virtuous? Aristotle does not
appeal to moral principles to answer this problem: there is
nothing in his ethical theory comparable to Kant's
Categorical Imperative or the Greatest Happiness principle of
utilitarianism, or to the Ten Commandments (though he
notes in 11.6,at 1107a10ff., that adultery, theft and murder
are always wrong). Instead, he uses the concept of a virtuous person to define the nature of virtue.
We can now see this strategy at work in two places in NE
II. The first is in 11.4,when he says that "acts are called just
and self-controlled when they are the kind of acts which a
just or self-controlled man would perform" [1105b5-7]. The
second, more famous, instance is in his definition of virtue
in 11.6.Moral virtue, he states,
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.. .is a characteristic involving choice, and .. .it consists in
observing the mean relative to us, a mean which is defined by a rational principle, such as a man of practical
wisdom would use to determine it [1106b36-1107a2].
In other words, virtue is a characteristic that enables us to
choose virtuous actions, and these are actions that would be
chosen by a person possessing practical wisdom. Aristotle
refers to this person as the phronimos. Phronesis, practical
wisdom, is an intellectual virtue, but one that can only be
possessed by someone who has already been habituated in
moral virtue. It is not mere skill in deliberation; that skill,
unaccompanied by moral virtue, Aristotle calls cleverness
[Vl.12, 1144a23ff.]. It is, rather, the ability to deliberate
well about the means to the end of eudaimonia,what we call
"happiness."
Aristotle thinks that moral virtue is what enables the individual to know what this end is, and we can see why from
what has been stated above. Eudaimonia,as Aristotle defines
it, is the state in which one habitually acts well and enjoys
doing so, and the process of forming good habits is the process of acquiring moral virtue. But eudaimoniais also a state
that involves rational activity, for it is, Aristotle thinks, a
distinctively human state and rationality is in his view a distinctively human trait.
Aristotle identifies the rational element in eudaimoniawith
phronesis,and phronesiswith deliberation:
The capacity of deliberating well about what is good and
advantageous for oneself is regarded as typical of a man
of practical wisdom-not deliberating well about what is
good and advantageous in a partial sense, for example,
what contributes to health or strength, but what sort of
thing contributes to the good life in general [VI.5,
1140a25ff.].
(Note that, though phronesis is the ability to deliberate well
about what is advantageous to oneself, Aristotle thinks that
what is truly advantageous to oneself, eudaimonia,is advantageous for everyone. It is the ability to think about what the
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good life in general is that makes the phronimos a model of
ethical thought and not just of narrow self-interest.)
The limitation of reasoning to deliberation is a flaw in
Aristotle's theory, I think, for he explicitly restricts deliberation to reasoning about the means to the good life, and leaves
it to moral virtue to supply the deliberator with a vision of
that end: as he states at 1144ag_9,"virtue makes us aim at the
right target, and practical wisdom makes us use the right
means." Apparently Aristotle thought that rational reflection
on the nature of the end was unnecessary; a peculiar view,
because he devotes most of Book I of the Nicomachean
Ethics to just that activity. We need to augment Aristotle's
account of the rationality of eudaimonia, therefore, by
adding to the ability to deliberate about the means to the good
life an ability to understand correctly the nature of that life
itself.
The phronimos becomes, on this revised Aristotelian view,
the person who both knows what eudaimonia is and can
figure out how to attain it. That knowledge will be grounded
in the habituation to moral virtue acquired in youth, but it
will not be identical with that habituation. It will be
reflective, not reflexive. Now Aristotle doubtless had a much
more precise view of the nature of the phronimos in mind
than this. He was undoubtedly influenced by the cultural
standards of classical Athens in this respect. It is virtually
certain that Aristotle's vision of the phronimos was that of a
free Greek male, a citizen of a polis. He did not picture
women or slaves or barbarians as phronimoi; in fact, his
own theory disqualified them for this role. Happily, though,
we need not follow him in this respect: we can detach the
ideal of the phronimos as a rational thinker about the good
life from the specific cultural environment in which Aristotle
wrote. Indeed, we must do this if we are to adapt his theory
to our present situation.
There is, however, one aspect of the cultural context in
which Aristotle wrote that I want to note, for it has an effect
on our ability to incorporate his thought into contemporary
American life. Remember that the phronimos is no less than
the foundation of Aristotle's ethical theory. We only under-
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stand the nature of virtue, moral reasoning, and eudaimonia
by understanding the phronimos. It is crucial, therefore, that
we be able to identify unproblematic instances of phronesis:
people who exemplify in their lives moral virtue and rational
thought about ethics-people who live the life of eudaimonia.
Aristotle apparently found this a simple matter, for he
scarcely touches on the question at all in the Nicoma.chean
Ethics. Rather, he writes as if his students, people who had
a proper upbringing, would have no difficulty in grasping
or in thinking of
what he meant by the phronimos,
examples. His attitude recalls that of Meletus in Plato's
Apology, who thought that virtually all the citizens of Athens
except Socrates provided suitable examples of good conduct,
or of Protagoras in the Protagoras and Anytus in the Meno,
who say virtually the same thing.
Aristotle's attitude may seem puzzling to us, coming as it
does after Socrates' relentless questioning of the ethical ideals of the ancient Athenians, and Plato's formulation of an
ethical model, the philosopher-king, who not only had no
earthly embodiment but seemed in principle unable to have
one. Yet Aristotle's attitude was, I think, far closer to that of
his contemporaries than was Plato's or Socrates'. We find
Socratic skepticism about the existence of moral exemplars
attractive because we think it hard to find unproblematic examples ourselves; and herein lies a major stumbling-block to
the incorporation of Aristotelian ethical thought into
American education.
As Alasdair MacIntyre has pointed out in After Virtue,
Aristotle's scheme of moral education depends on a threefold
distinction:
Within that teleological scheme there is a fundamental
contrast between man-as-he-happens-to-be and man-ashe-could-be-if-he-realized-his-essential-nature. Ethics is
the science which is to enable men to make the transition
from the former state to the latter. Ethics therefore on this
view presupposes some account of potentiality and act,
some account of the essence of man as a rational animal
and above all some account of the human telos [p. 50].
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Maclntyre's argument is that only with this threefold
scheme can we make sense of ethical principles. As he
states, "each of the three elements of the scheme ... requires
reference to the other two if its status and function are to be
intelligible" [p. 51]. His historical claim is that we have lost
the means to construct an account of the third stage, the human telos, what Aristotle called eudaimonia, and that this
loss has rendered ethical principles unintelligible and led to
moral chaos. I cannot recapitulate MacIntyre' s case, which I
regard as powerful and largely convincing, here.
Fortunately, the point I want to make does not depend on
establishing the claim that only an Aristotelian teleology
makes moral theory intelligible.
My point is simply this. Though the process of acquiring
moral virtue is a process of habit formation and cannot be
taught, but can only be acquired through training, the process of reflection on the end of life and the means to achieve
it is an intellectual one and can be taught. It can only be
taught, however, in a culture where there is some measure of
agreement about the nature of that end; and, if Aristotle is
correct against Plato, it can only be taught in a culture where
there are unproblematic examples of people living good
lives. Even if Plato is correct about the philosophical possibility of basing an ethical theory on an unrealized and probably unrealizable ideal such as the philosopher-king, that
possibility will only be a live one for students who have
Plato's love for abstract intellectual activity. Most people will
require examples.
I suggest that this is just what our culture is at present unable to provide. In order to test this hypothesis, you might
try to generate a discussion in your classrooms of people the
students think are leading good lives, lives they would like
to emulate. If your experience is like mine, the ethical examples will peter out shortly after Mother Teresa is mentioned, and non-ethical examples such as Donald Trump,
Madonna and Joe Montana will replace them.
Nor will the discussion improve if, instead of focusing on
the end of life, you concentrate on the means, and ask for
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examples of virtue. I asked my upper-division college ethics
class a couple of weeks ago to discuss the issue of character
and to try to come up with examples of people who had
character. This discussion did not take place out of the blue:
they had been assigned to read some material on this subject,
and some had written papers on the reading. In discussion,
however, this group, which consisted in part of advanced
philosophy majors, was unable to identify traits essential to
the possession of character, though the reading had
mentioned such attributes as honesty, responsibility,
perseverance and concern for the well-being of others as
partially constitutive of character, and was unable to come to
settled answers on such questions as whether the possession
of character was a good thing, and whether people such as
Hitler, the captain of the Exxon Valdez, and Oliver North
possessed or lacked character.
Our students, I suggest, lack the wherewithal, the vocabulary and the conceptual scheme necessary to discriminate
between good and bad character, good and bad lives. They
also lack the ability to formulate clear principles of moral
conduct; if MacIntyre is right, they lack the latter ability because they lack the former. Even those with good intuitions
about ethics find it impossible to justify those intuitions theoretically. The role-models our culture provides through the
mass media are almost always negative; but the students,
even when they reject these models for their own lives, are
unable to criticize them effectively or suggest alternatives.
Nor can they tum to literature and history, as could the students of my generation, for examples of ethical conduct; for
the moral interpretation of literature and the moral use of
history are about equally unpopular (as they were about
equally popular in Aristotle's time). As the authors of Habits
of the Heart put it, the impoverished moral vocabulary of
utilitarian and expressive individualism, which justify respectively whatever works and whatever feels good, have
become the first languages of contemporary moral discourse,
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virtually eclipsing the older, second languages of the Biblical
and republican traditions.4
What is to be done? More specifically, what's a teacher to
do? Perhaps nowhere is the confusion engendered by our
contemporary moral situation more evident than in our disparate attempts to answer this question. At one extreme,
there is the view of Michael Levin, stated in a New York
Times editorial dated 28 November, 1989, entitled "Ethics
Courses: Useless":
Moral behavior is the product of training, not
reflection ... abstract knowledge of right and wrong no
more contributes to character than knowledge of physics
contributes to bicycling. The idea in both cases is to
build the proper responses into nerve and sinew.
Bicyclists don't have to think about which way to lean
and honest men don't have to think about how to answer
under oath. There is certainly a place for philosophical
reflection on the existence and nature of values. But its
practical significance is nil.
On the other hand, when attention was drawn by recent
events on this campus to the continued existence of racist
and sexist attitudes among students, the call went out for
course requirements to correct these attitudes (though the
courses in question were not, interestingly enough, in ethics,
but in ethnic and women's studies).
I think it is clear what Aristotle would say about these opposite approaches. He would say that offering courses
would do no good if a sound basis in moral virtue had not
been laid down first in the students taking them. In this respect he would agree with Levin. He would also say,
though, that education could refine and perfect the moral
thinking of people who had such a training, that the effect of

4 Robert N. Bellah et al., Habits of the Heart: Individualism and
Commitment in American Life (Berkeley, 1985).
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philosophical reflection on a well-trained population would
not be nil, but could be highly significant. In assessing our
current situation, he would recommend that we undertake to
develop a socially accepted set of values and inculcate them
in our youth by moral training, and he would say that, in the
absence of that, there is little educators can do to alter matters. He would recommend, in the words of Rick Redfern,
an unambiguous moral education as the means to the development of a sturdy character, and he would see a sturdy
character as the necessary means to a life of dignity, self-respect, and eudaimonia. Any culture which attempted to attain
the benefits of eudaimonia without going through the process of character development, and any culture that lacked
the wherewithal to provide the necessary unambiguous
moral education, he would write off as hopeless, as he wrote
off those who did not take their physicians' advice but criticized it instead. If he is correct about all of this, and if we are
unwilling to accept his verdict on our culture, the task for us
is the provision for our children of that unambiguous moral
education we now lack. In that task, I suggest, the role of
the schools, though important, is limited to developing and
correcting the values of our culture; the primary task of
moral development lies not in formal education but in the
larger school of society.
William J. Prior
Santa Clara University

